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INTRODUCTION

From the time of its emergence in the Duke of Norfolk's Case,1
the Common-law Rule Against Perpetuities (Common-law Rule) has
been the primary means used by the Anglo-American legal system to
limit a person's power to control the disposition of their wealth after
their death.2 The Rule Against Perpetuities accomplishes this by invalidating future interests that vest too remotely. The classic statement of
the Rule is deceptively simple: "No interest is good unless, it must
years after some life in being
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
3
interest."
the
at the creation of
The Common-law Rule is noted for its unjust consequences because it disregards actual events and invalidates nonvested future interests entirely on the grounds of what might happen. Under the Common-law Rule's "what-might-happen" approach, reasonable dispositions
can be rendered invalid by such obscure possibilities as an eighty-year
old woman giving birth to additional children,4 a married person in
his or her middle or late years later marrying a person born after the
transfer,5 or the probate of an estate taking more than 21 years to
complete. 6 A frequently-quoted statement of Professor W. Barton
Leach summarizes both the Common-law Rule and the argument for
its reform:

1. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
2. THOMAS F. BERGxN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 178 (2d ed. 1984).
3. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
4. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Brody, 392 A.2d 445, 450 (Conn. 1978); see
also Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787) ("For the purpose of applying
the rule against perpetuities, both men and women are considered capable of having issue
so long as they live"); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 228 N.W. 703, 704 (Mich. 1930)
(childless woman of 52 presumed capable of having children); Crockett v. Scott, 284
S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1955) (woman of 50 presumed capable of having children); Turner v.
Turner, 196 S.E.2d 498, 501 (S.C. 1973) (in applying the Common-law Rule, "[tihe possibility of childbirth is never extinct").
5. Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 595 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1980); Lanier v. Lanier,
126 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. 1962); Perkins v. Iglehart, 39 A.2d 672 (Md. 1944); Brookover v.
Grimm, 190 S.E. 697 (W. Va. 1937).
6. Prime v. Hyne, 67 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Ct. App. 1968); Ryan v. Beshk, 170 N.E. 699
(Ill. 1930).
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The Rule Against Perpetuities is a technicality-ridden legal nightmare,
designed to meet problems of past centuries that are almost nonexistent
today. Most of the time it defeats reasonable dispositions of reasonable
property owners, and often it defeats itself. It is a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of the bar.'

West Virginia recently joined the ranks of a growing number of
jurisdictions seeking to reform the Rule Against Perpetuities by adopting the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP),8 which
became effective on May 10, 1992. 9 The USRAP was promulgated by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1986.10 Since then, it has been unanimously endorsed by the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association, the Board of Regents
of the American College of Probate Counsel, and the Board of GoverIncluding
nors of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers." 12
USRAP.
the
adopted
now
have
West Virginia, eighteen states
The USRAP uses wait-and-see/deferred reformation in a three-step
approach to perpetuity reform. Under step one, a nonvested future
interest in property is valid at the moment of its creation if it satisfies
7. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1349 (1954); see also Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (holding that an attorney
who drafted a will in such manner that the trust provisions violated the Rule Against Perpetuities was not liable to the beneficiaries of the trust on the basis of negligence or breach
of contract).
8.

UNIF.

STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUES, 8A

U.L.A. 342 (Supp. 1992)

[hereinafter USRAP].
9. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1 to -8 (Supp. 1992).
10. USRAP, supra note 8, at 342.
11. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986) [hereinafter Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule].
12. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200 to 21231 (Deering 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1511-1101 to 15-11-1106 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-490 to 45a-496 (1990); FLA.
STAT. ch. 689.225 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-6-200 to 44-6-206 (1992); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-1-4.1-1 to 32-1-4.1-6 (Bums 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, §§ 1 to 11
(Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71 to 554.78 (1991); MINN. STAT.
§§ 501A.01 to 501A.07 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-1-801 to 70-1-807 (1989); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 76-2001 to 76-2008 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103 to 111.1039
(Michie 1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-1 to 46:2F-8 (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2-1001 (Michie 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27.1 to 47-02-27.5 (1991); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 105.950 to 105.975 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to 27-6-80 (Law.
Co-op. 1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-IA-1 to 36-1A-6 (Supp. 1992).
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the Common-law Rule.' 3 Step two salvages future interests that would
have been invalid at common-law by providing a 90-year waiting
period -for the contingencies to work out harmlessly. 4 Finally, step
three provides for deferred reformation of future interests that violate
the Common-law Rule and do not in fact vest within the 90-year
waiting period."5
This Note will examine the important aspects of West Virginia's
adoption of the USRAP. First, it will review perpetuities law in West
Virginia as it existed prior to the adoption of the USRAP. Second, it
will analyze the principal features of the USRAP. Third, it will examine the practical implications of the USRAP, including estate planning
aspects, commercial transfers, and potential problems created by the
Act. Finally, it will survey alternate methods of perpetuities reform
followed in other states.
II. PRIOR LAW IN WEST VIRGINIA

A.

Common-Law Rule Against Perpetuities

Since its inception in 1863, West Virginia has followed the common-law and thus acknowledged the Common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 16 As early as 1869, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the Common-law Rule in its traditional form explaining that:
An executory devise, either of real or personal estate, is good if limited to

vest within the compass of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years

afterwards, adding thereto, however, in case of an infant en ventre sa
13. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-l(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1(a)(1).
14. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-l(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § l(a)(2).

15. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3.
16. W. VA. CODE, vol. 1, Report of Code Commission at VIII explains:

During the Civil War the State of West Virginia was created and, by section 8, of
Article XI of its Constitution of 1863, such parts of the common law and of the
laws of the State of Virginia as were in force within the boundaries of the State
of West Virginia when the Constitution became effective, and were not repugnant
thereto, were declared to be the law of this State until altered or repealed by the
legislature.
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mere, sufficient time to cover the ordinary period of gestation of such
child. But the limitation, in order to be valid, must be so made that the
estate, or whatever is devised or bequeathed, not only may, but must,
necessarily vest within the prescribed period."7

The Common-law Rule was rigidly applied in West Virginia until
1980,18 when the state engaged in its first efforts to reform the Rule
Against Perpetuities. In Berry v. Union National Bank,19 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals judicially reformed the Rule
the harsh consequences of
Against Perpetuities in order to "ameliorate
'remorseless application' of the rule."20
B.

Equitable Modification

In Berry, the testatrix, Clara Clayton Post, died in 1975 leaving a
will that created a private educational trust for the descendants of her
late husband's brothers and sisters.21 The trustee, the Union National
Bank, was given absolute discretion to provide educational expenses
for class members satisfying certain criteria, and the trust was to endure for twenty-five years after the testatrix' death or until the princi-2
pal was reduced to less than $5,000, whichever should first occur.
At the termination of the trust the remaining principal and interest
were to be distributed per stirpes to the then living descendants of the
brothers and sisters of the testatrix' husband.23
Realizing that the trust potentially violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, the executrix, Josephine Berry, initiated a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether the trust in fact violated the Rule Against

17. Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597, 612 (1869).
18. See Greco v. Meadow River Coal & Land Co., 113 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1960);
First Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 79 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1953);
Brookover v. Grimm, 190 S.E. 697 (W. Va. 1937); Hooper v. Wood, 125 S.E. 350 (W.
Va. 1924); Prichard v. Prichard, 113 S.E. 256 (W. Va. 1922); Knox v. Knox, 9 W. Va.
124 (1876).
19. 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980).
20. Il at 770.
21. Id. at 767-68.
22. Id at 768 n.1.
23. Id.
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Perpetuities and whether it was proper for the executrix and trustee to
enter into a trust termination agreement that amended the twenty-five
year trust duration to twenty-one years. The trial court found that the
trust provision did violate the Rule Against Perpetuities and was therefore void ,tnd without force.' In addition, the trial court ruled that
the executrix and trustee were not authorized to enter a trust termination agreement.5 Executrix Berry appealed these findings to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court held that the will of Clara Clayton Post
should be judicially reformed to reduce the duration of the trust from
twenty-five years to twenty-one years.2 6 In reaching its decision, the
court adopted a doctrine of "equitable modification".27 This doctrine
applied to certain devises that on their face violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities but which could be modified to conform with the rule's
underlying policy.
Under the doctrine of equitable modification, a noncharitable devise or bequest that violated the rule was modified if the following
conditions were met:
(1) The testator's intent is expressed in the instrument or can be readily
determined by a court;
(2) The testator's general intent does not violate the rule against perpetuities;
(3) The testator's particular intent, which does violate the rule, is not a
critical aspect of the testamentary scheme; and
(4) The proposed modification will effectuate the testator's general intent,
will avoid the consequences of intestacy, and will conform to the policy
considerations underlying the rule. 8
The testamentary trust in Berry met all the criteria for application
of the equitable modification doctrine.2 9 First, the general intent of
the testatrix was clearly expressed in Section IX of her will when she

24. M
25. M
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 772.
I& at 770.
Id. at 771.
Id
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stated: "I believe it was the desire of my husband that such funds as I
might have at my death should be used to help such persons [who are
later defined in this section] obtain educations."" Second, her general
intention to provide funds for the education of her husband's nieces,
nephews and their families did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Third, there was no indication that the twenty-five year period
was a critical aspect of her testamentary scheme. Finally, the court felt
that modifying the trust to reduce the twenty-five year period to twenty-one years would effectuate the testatrix' general intent, avoid intestacy for that portion of her estate, and ensure that property would not
be controlled beyond the perpetuities period.31
C.

Cy Presfor Charitable Trusts

In addition to the doctrine of equitable modification, West Virginia
also recognizes the doctrine of cy pres, which applies to charitable
trusts. Under the trust doctrine of cy pres, if "property is given in
trust for a particular
fail even though it
pose., 33 In 1931, the
of the West Virginia
and gives the court

charitable purpose, the trust will not ordinarily
is impossible to carry out the particular purWest Virginia Legislature enacted section 35-2-2
Code which applies cy pres to charitable trusts

full power to appoint or designate a trustee or trustees to execute the trust,

or to designate the beneficiaries in, or the objects of, any such trust, or
where such trust does not admit the specific enforcement or literal execution, to carry into effect as1 near as may be the intent and purposes of the
person creating such trust.3

Accordingly, the Rule Against Perpetuities is generally not applicable
to gifts to public charities in West Virginia.35
30. Ia
31. I
32. W. VA. CODE § 35-2-2 (1985).
33. 4A SCOTr ON TRUSTS § 399 (4th ed. 1987).
34. W. VA. CODE § 35-2-2 (1985).
35. Merchantile Banking & Trust Co. v. Showacre, 135 S.E. 9, syl. pt. 4 (W. Va.
1926) ("Generally, the rule against perpetuities has no application to such gifts to public
charities, and it has no application to the particular trust involved in this case.").
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To briefly summarize, prior to the adoption of the USRAP, West
Virginia recognized the Common-law Rule in its traditional form.
However, the Common-law Rule generally did not apply to gifts to
public charities, and immediate judicial reformation was available for
certain noncharitable devises or bequests that violated the rule.
III. PRINCIPLE FEATUREs OF THE USRAP
The USRAP employs a three-step approach to perpetuity reform.
These steps include: 1) the preservation of the Common-law Rule, 2) a
90-year wait-and-see period for interests that violate the Common-law
Rule, and 3) deferred reformation of interests that do not in fact vest
within the 90-year period. This section will examine in depth each of
the three steps employed by the Uniform Act. In addition, it will discuss the prospective application of the USRAP.
A.

Preservation of the Common-Law Rule Period

Under the USRAP a nonvested property interest is first measured
against the Common-law Rule to determine whether it is initially valid.36 Despite the Act's express supersession of the Common-law
Rule, 3 7 a nonvested property interest is valid if it satisfies the Com38
mon-law Rule using the common-law methodology.
As the Commentary to the USRAP explains, there are two sides to
the Common-law Rule-a validating side and an invalidating side.39
Under the validating side of the Common-law Rule a "nonvested property interest is valid when it is created (initially valid) if it is then certain to vest or terminate ... no later than 21 years after the death of
an individual then alive." 40 In contrast, the invalidating side of the

36. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1.
37. W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-8 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 9.
38. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-l(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) states in pertinent part: "(a) A
nonvested property interest is invalid unless: (1) When the interest is created, it is certain to
vest or terminate no later than twenty-one years after the death of an individual then
alive . ...
39. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note. at 343.
40. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 343.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss1/8

8

Moore: The Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities: Taming the Techn

1992]

UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

Common-law Rule invalidates a nonvested property interest when it is
created if there is no such certainty that the interest will vest or terminate no later than 21 years after the death of an individual then
alive.41
The USRAP preserves the validating side of the Common-law
Rule and upholds the validity of property interests that satisfy the
Common-law Rule. As a result, trusts and other property arrangements
that would have been valid under the Common-law Rule, including
instruments that are rendered valid because of a perpetuity saving
clause,4 2 remain valid under ,the Uniform Act. Thus, lawyers who
competently draft trusts, wills, and other property arrangements for
their clients will not be affected by the Act.
B.

Wait and See Test

A nonvested property interest that fails to satisfy the Common-law
test under the USRAP is not immediately invalidated. Instead, the
USRAP rejects the common-law "what-might-happen" approach and
alters the Common-law Rule's invalidating side by adopting a "waitand-see" test that allows a court to delay its determination of the
interest's validity until 90 years have passed from the effective date of
its creation.43
If the nonvested property interest does in fact vest during the 90year period, it satisfies the USRAP. On the other hand, if the interest
has not vested after 90 years, it becomes subject to the USRAP's
deferred reformation feature."4 Thus, the "wait-and-see" approach
adopted by the USRAP in effect recognizes all interests as valid for
perpetuities purposes for at least 90 years.

41. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 343.
42. See discussion infra part IV.A.2.
43. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1(a)(2) (Supp. 1992) states 'in pertinent part: "A nonvested
property interest is invalid unless: . . . (2) The interest either vests or terminates within
ninety years after its creation."
44. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3; see discussion
infra part 1U.C.
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1. Saving-Clause Function
The 90-year "wait-and-see" period adopted by the USRAP is intended to provide, in effect, a saving clause for trusts or other property
arrangements that violate the Common-law Rule. 45 A perpetuity saving clause is a provision of an estate plan that is designed to prevent a
perpetuities violation and takes effect only in the event that any
nonvested interests under the plan have not vested within the perpetuities period. 6 The typical saving clause contains two components,
the perpetuity-period component and the gift-over component. These
two components are best explained as follows:
The perpetuity-period component expressly requires interests in the trust or
other arrangement to vest (or terminate) no later than 21 years after the
death of the last survivor of a group of individuals designated in the governing instrument by name or class. The gift-over component expressly
creates a gift over that is guaranteed to vest at the expiration of the period
established in the perpetuity-period component, but only if the interests in
the trust or other arrangement have neither vested nor terminated earlier in
accordance with their other terms.4'

The USRAP's 90-year waiting period is designed to function as
the* equivalent of the perpetuity-period component of a well-drafted
saving clause." The near equivalent of a gift-over component is provided by the USRAP's provisions for judicial reformation of property
interests that do not vest within the 90-year waiting period.49
2. Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period
The 90-year waiting period adopted by the USRAP is designed to
represent "a reasonable approximation of-a proxy for-the period of

45. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 344-45.
46. A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING § 11.4.5 (5th ed. 1986).
47. Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 11, at 574.
48. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 345. But see Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023
(1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo] (arguing that the USRAP's 90-year
wait-and-see period does not provide the equivalent of a well drafted saving clause).
49. See discussion infra part m.C.
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time that would, on average, be produced by identifying and tracing an
actual set of measuring lives and then tacking on a 21-year period
following the death of the survivor." 50 The framers of the Act arrived
at the selection of 90 years by relying on a statistical study suggesting
that the youngest measuring life, on average, is approximately six
years old.5 1 The 21-year tack-on period was then added to the remaining life expectancy of a six-year-old child, yielding the allowable
waiting period of 90 years.52
The USRAP refrains from the conventional use of actual measuring lives and instead uses a flat period of 90 years for several reasons.
First, the conventional approach of using actual measuring lives has a
serious drawback because of the difficulty involved in drafting statutory language that unambiguously identifies the actual measuring
lives.53 Unlike an actual perpetuity saving clause that can be redrafted
for each new disposition,
a statutory saving clause must be drafted "so
54
all."
fits
size
one
that
A second serious disadvantage of the actual-measuring-lives approach is the costly administrative burden it imposes by requiring the
actual tracing of individual's lives, deaths, marriages, adoptions, and
divorces in order to determine the allowable waiting period.55 The flat
90-year period used by the USRAP avoids each of these problems by
applying a uniform wait-and-see
period that is "litigation-free, easy to
56
unmistakable."
and
determine,

50. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 347.
51. Lawrence Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 20 INST. ON EST. PLAN. Ch. 7 (1986).
52. The U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1986) reported the remaining life expectancy of a six-year old child as 69.6 years. However, the drafters of the USRAP used 69 years as an approximate measure of the remaining life expectancy of a six-year old in order to arrive at an end number that is a multiple of five. See
generally USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 347.
53. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 345.
54. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 345.
55. USRAP, supra note 8, prefatory note at 345-46.
56. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 164 (1988) [hereinafter
Waggoner, Rationale].
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C. Deferred Reformation of Interests that Violate the Rule
If a nonvested property interest fails to satisfy the Common-law
and fails to vest within the 90-year wait-and-see period,5 the
requires judicial reformation of the disposition in a way that most
closely approximates the transferor's intended disposition yet complies
with the statute's 90-year vesting period.5 9 The USRAP also grants
the right to reformation before the expiration of the 90-year wait-andsee period when it becomes necessary to do so or when there is no
point in waiting for the 90-year period to expire.'
test5 7

The theory behind the deferred-reformation feature is to postpone
reformation until it becomes truly necessary, thereby substantially reducing the number of reformation suits.6" Deferring the right to reformation until after the expiration of the 90-year waiting period gives
the donor's disposition every reasonable opportunity to work itself out
without premature interference.
Because reformation is permitted only for dispositions that would
have been invalid at common law,62 and because almost all trusts and

57. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-l(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1(a)(1).
58. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1(a)(2).
59. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3.
60. Upon petition of an interested person, W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 requires judicial
reformation of a disposition if any one of three events occur:
(1) When, after the application of the Statutory Rule, a nonvested property interest or power of appointment becomes invalid under the Statutory Rule;
(2) When a class gift has not yet but still might become invalid under the Statutory Rule and the time has arrived when the share of one or more class members
is to take effect in possession or enjoyment; and
(3) When a nonvested property interest can vest, but cannot do so before the
allowable 90-year period has expired.
W. VA. CODE

§

36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992).

61. Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 11, at 596.
62. A trust or other property arrangement that satisfies the Common-law Rule is permitted to completely run its course without the interference of a reformation suit, even if
the term of the trust exceeds 90 years. Thus, one could defend a reformation suit by establishing that the disposition did not violate the Common-law Rule in the first place. See
generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Oregon
Joins Up, 26 WIULJAMErm L. REv. 259, 265 n.21 (1990) [hereinafter Waggoner, Oregon
Joins Up].
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other property arrangements will have terminated by their own terms
before the expiration of 90 years, application of the deferred-reformation feature will be infrequent. However, if the right to reformation
does arise, the court is given two criteria to work with: the transferor's
manifested plan of distribution and the allowable 90-year period.63 In
addition, the comments to section 3 of the USRAP discuss the manner
in which dispositions should be reformed and provide various illustrations that can give guidance to courts in a variety of cases.'
D. Prospective Application of the Rule
The USRAP effectively applies to all nonvested property interests
that violate either the Common-law Rule or the USRAP. 65 Nevertheless, the effective date of creation of the offending nonvested interest
will affect the reformation process used by the court.'
If the nonvested interest is created on 'or after May 10, 1992, the
general provisions of the USRAP apply.67 Accordingly, if an interest
created on or after May 10, 1992, violates the Common-law Rule and
does not vest or terminate within the 90-year period, the court must"
reform the interest to satisfy both the transferor's manifested plan of
distribution and the statutory 90-year period.69
By contrast, if the offending interest is created before May 10,
1992, the court may reform the interest70 to satisfy both the
63. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992).
64. USRAP, supra note 8, § 3 cmt.
65. W. VA. CODE § 36-lA-5 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 5.
66. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-5(ay (Supp. 1992) states: "For the purposes of this section,
a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created by the exercise of a power
of appointment is created when the power is irrevocably exercised or when a revocable
exercise becomes irrevocable."
67. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-5(a) states in pertinent part: "this article applies to a
nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is created on or after the effective date of this article." The law provides that this article take effect 90 days from passage
(passed Feb. 10, 1992). 1992 W. Va. Acts ch. 74.
68. Reformation is mandatory in this situation. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 applies to
dispositions created on or after May 10, 1992 and states in pertinent part: "a court shall
reform a disposition." Ma (emphasis added).
69. W. VA.CODE § 36-IA-5(a) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
70. Reformation of an interest created before May 10, 1992, is not mandatory:
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transferor's manifested plan of distribution and the perpetuities rule in
effect when the interest was created. 71 Thus, under the USRAP in
West Virginia, a court may immediately reform an instrument created
before May 10, 1992 that violates the Common-law Rule.
IV.

PRACICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE

USRAP

Although most lawyers do not encounter legal problems pertaining
to the Rule Against Perpetuities on a regular basis, there are several
practical implications of the USRAP well worth understanding. These
practical implications concern estate planning, nondonative transfers,
and potential problems created by the USRAP.
A.

Estate Planning Aspects
1.

Incentives to Comply With the Common-law Rule

Under the USRAP, there are several incentives for estate planners
to continue drafting instruments that comply with the Common-law
Rule. Because the USRAP sustains the validity of trusts or other property arrangements that satisfy the Rule Against Perpetuities in its traditional form,72 significant advantages arise from compliance with the
Common-law Rule.
A major advantage of compliance with the Common-law Rule is
that the disposition is valid from the moment of its creation. Thus, if a

If a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment was created before the
effective date of this article and is determined in a judicial proceeding, commenced
on or after the effective date of this article, to violate this state's rule against
perpetuities as that rule existed before the effective date of this article, a court
upon the petition of an interested person may reform the disposition in the manner
that most closely approximates the transferor's manifested plan of distribution and
is within the limits of the rule against perpetuities applicable when the nonvested
property interest or power of appointment was created.
W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-5(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
71. In West Virginia prior to May 10, 1992, the Common-law Rule, as modified by
Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980), was in effect; see supra part
IIA-B.
72. See discussion supra part III.A.
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lawyer in West Virginia drafts a testamentary trust that complies with
the Common-law Rule, both West Virginia courts and courts in a
common-law jurisdiction will uphold the trust. Such a trust is valid not
only if the client dies domiciled in West Virginia, but also if the client
dies domiciled in (or owns land covered by the trust in) a jurisdiction
following the Common-law Rule.7"
In addition, compliance with the Common-law Rule eliminates the
possibility of a future reformation suit under the USRAP's deferred
reformation provisions. These reformation provisions apply only to
dispositions governed by the Act's wait-and-see test and are never
applicable to dispositions that are initially valid under the Common-law
Rule.74
2.

Use of Saving Clauses

Numerous incentives exist under the USRAP to comply with the
Common-law Rule. Accordingly, lawyers should continue to use traditional perpetuity saving clauses that provide for termination of a trust
21 years after the death of the specified lives in being if the trust has
not already terminated under its own dispositive provisions. By using a
traditional saving clause, the property arrangement will be valid from
the moment of its creation75 and any possibility of deferred reformation under the Act will be eliminated.76
In some states that have adopted the USRAP, lawyers adjust the
traditional perpetuity saving clause "to provide for termination at the
later of (1) 21 years after the death of the last surviving beneficiary in
being when the trust was created, or (2) [90 years]."77 These "later
of' clauses are used in an attempt to turn the USRAP's 90-year wait-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Waggoner, Oregon Joins Up, supra note 62, at 261.
See discussion part m.C.
W. VA. CODE § 36-la-l(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1(a)(1).
W. VA. CODE § 36-la-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3.
Waggoner, Oregon Joins Up, supra note 62, at 261-62 n.9.
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and-see period into a minimum time period in which the trust will terminate."
The comments to the USRAP discourage the use of "later of"
clauses, explaining that "later of" clauses that achieve a "later of"
result constitute "an improper use of the 90-year permissible vesting
period ... [that] is designed to approximate the period that, on average, would be produced by using actual lives in being plus 21
years." 79 In response, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) amended the USRAP by adding a
subsection that limits the effect of "later of" clauses."0 This amendment, which was not adopted in West Virginia, provides in essence
that a trust termination clause purporting to delay termination to the
longer of the Common-law or a fixed year period, operates to terminate the trust only on the expiration of the Common-law period.
Because this amendment has not been adopted in West Virginia,
lawyers drafting instruments in the state may be tempted to use "later
of" saving clauses in an attempt to utilize the USRAP's 90-year waitand-see period as a minimum time period for trust duration. However,
the use of such a clause would not cure a perpetuity violation in a
trust with terms that violate the Common-law Rule and would actually
create a perpetuity violation if used as a provision that directly regulates a trust.
If used as an override clause in a trust that violates the Commonlaw Rule, the "later of" clause will not qualify the trust for validity

78. USRAP, supra note 8, § 1 cmt. G.
79. USRAP, supra note 8, § 1 cmt. G.
80. USRAP, supra note 8, § l(e) states:
(e) [Effect of Certain "Later-of" Type Language.] If, in measuring a period from
the creation of a trust or other property arrangement, language in a governing
instrument (i) seeks to disallow the vesting or termination of any interest or trust
beyond, (ii) seeks to postpone the vesting or termination of any interest or trust
until, or (iii) seeks to operate in effect in any similar fashion upon, the later of
(A) the expiration of a period of time not exceeding 21 years after the death of
the survivor of specified lives in being at the creation of the trust or other property arrangement or (B) the expiration of a period of time that exceeds or might
exceed 21 years after the death of the survivor of lives in being at the creation of
the trust or other property arrangement, that language is inoperative to the extent it
produces a period of time that exceeds 21 years after the death of the survivor of
the specified lives.
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under the USRAP because the clause does not guarantee that all interests will be certain to vest or terminate no later than 21 years after
the death of the specified lives in being." This in turn subjects the
trust to the USRAP's 90-year wait-and-see test8 2 and makes the trust
83
vulnerable to a reformation suit.
If a "later of" clause is used as a provision that directly regulates
the duration of a trust, the clause does not guarantee that all interests
will be certain to vest or terminate within 21 years after the death of
any specified lives in being at the creation of the trust. Consequently,
the use of a "later of" clause in this manner actually creates a perpetuity violation under the USRAP, 4 subjects the trust to the 90-year
wait-and-see test,85 and makes the trust vulnerable to a reformation
suit.8 6 .
3.

Federal Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax

Since the USRAP was promulgated, several scholarly articles have
discussed the existence of a possible generation-skipping transfer
(GST) tax trap created by the Act. 7 To best understand this potential
tax trap, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the GST tax.
The GST tax is designed to eliminate a loophole in the estate and
gift tax system, where in some instances upon a child's death, no tax
is imposed on a transfer from the child's parents that benefits the child
for life and then passes to the child's children. This loophole, in some
cases, may allow property to pass through two generations while being

81. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § l(a)(1).
82. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1(a)(2) does not grant nonvested interests a permissible
vesting period of either 90 years or a period of 21 years after the death of the lives in
being. Instead, the nonvested interest must actually vest or terminate within 90 years after
its creation.
83. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3.
84. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-1(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1(a)(1).
85. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-l(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 1(a)(2).
86. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3.
87. Ira M. Bloom & Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities Reformers Beware: The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Tax Trap, .25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 203 (1986)
[hereinafter Bloom & Dukeminier, Tax Trap].
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subject only once to estate and gift taxes. The GST tax system eliminates this problem by imposing a tax on transfers to persons more
than one generation below the grantor.88 When applicable, the GST
tax is imposed at a flat rate of 55% across the board.89
Irrevocable trusts created before September 26, 1985, are generally
exempt (grandfathered) from the GST tax.9" However, the Treasury
Department has issued a regulation that revokes the tax exemption of
the trust (ungrandfathers) if the exercise of a special power of appointment delays the vesting of a beneficial interest in the trust beyond the
Common-law Rule period as measured from the creation of the
trust.91 Once ungrandfathered, the trust becomes subject to GST taxation.
The GST tax trap arises because under the USRAP, the validity of
the exercise of a special power of appointment over the assets of a
trust is governed by the provisions of the USRAP, even if the power
itself was created prior to the effective date of the Act.' Therefore,
the USRAP permits the exercise of a special power of appointment in
a trust that has been grandfathered from the GST tax to allow the
vesting of a nonvested interest beyond the Common-law Rule period.
This in turn may cause the revocation of the exempt status of the trust

88. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662 (1988).
89. I.R.C. § 2602 (1988).
90. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (1988) (implementing Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1433 (b)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 2085, 2731 (1986)).
91. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B) (1988) provides as follows:
(B) Special rule for certain powers of appointment. The release, exercise, or lapse
of a power of appointment (other than a general power of appointment as defined
in section 2041(b)) will not be treated as an addition to a trust if(1) Such power of appointment was created in an irrevocable trust that is not
subject to Chapter 13 under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and
(2) In the case of an exercise, such power of appointment is not exercised in a
manner that may postpone or suspend the vesting, absolute ownership or power of
alienation of an interest in property for a period, measured from the date of creation of the trust, extending beyond any life in being at the date of creation of
the trust plus a period of 21 years. If a power is exercised by creating another
power, it will be deemed to be exercised to whatever extent the second power
may be exercised.
92. See discussion supra part mI.D; see also USRAP, supra note 8, § 5 cmt.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss1/8

18

Moore: The Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities: Taming the Techn
19921

UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

211

and subject it to the GST tax. The GST tax trap has been summarized
by Professors Bloom and Dukeminier as follows:
If the donee of a special power of appointment in a grandfathered trust
exercises the power by appointing the trust principal so as to violate the
common law Rule against Perpetuities, although nevertheless valid under
USRAP, the trust will lose its GST tax exemption because the exercise
may postpone vesting beyond lives in being plus 21 years.93

In response to the GST tax trap claim, the NCCUSL filed a formal request with the Treasury Department asking that measures be
taken to coordinate the Treasury regulations with the USRAP. 94 The
Treasury Department answered this request by stating that it "will
amend the temporary regulations to accommodate the 90-year period
under USRAP as originally promulgated [in 1986] or as amended [in
1990 by the addition of subsection (e)]." 95
According to the drafters of the USRAP:
This should effectively remove the possibility of loss of grandfathered
status under the Uniform Act merely because the donee of a nongeneral
power created in a grandfathered trust inadvertently exercises that power in
violation of the Common-law Rule or merely because the donee exercises
that power by creating a second nongeneral power that might, in the future, be inadvertently exercised in violation of the Common-law Rule.'

However, the Treasury Department has stated that any effort by
the donee of a nongeneral power in a grandfathered trust to obtain a
"later-of' specified lives-in-being plus 21 years or 90 years approach
will bring the grandfathered status of the trust to an end, unless the
effort to obtain the "later-of' approach is nullified by state law.97 Despite the fact that West Virginia has not adopted the NCCUSL's pro-

93. Bloom & Dukeminier, Tax Trap, supra note 87, at 205.
94. USRAP, supra note 8, § 1 cmt. G.
95. USRAP, supra note 8, § 1 cmt. G (citing letter from Michael J. Graetz, Deputy
Assistant Secretary cf the Treasury (Tax Policy), to Lawrence J. Bugge, President, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Nov. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Treasury

Letter]).
96. USRAP, supra note 8, § 1 cemt. G.
97. USRAP, supra note 8, § 1 cmt. G (citing Treasury Letter).
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posed amendment which nullifies attempts to achieve such a "later-of'
result,98 lawyers can easily avoid the potential GST tax trap. Lawyers
in the state should simply advise clients not to exercise special powers
in grandfathered trusts that would delay vesting beyond the Commonlaw Rule period.
B. Nondonative Transfers
1.

Commercial Transactions

Section 4 of the USRAP 99 lists seven exclusions from the statutory rule."° The most important exclusion, in terms of commercial
See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-4 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 4.
W. VA. CODE § 36-IA-4 states:
provisions of section one [§ 36A-I-1] of this article do not apply to:
(1) A nonvested property interest or a power of appointment arising out of a
nondonative transfer, except a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment arising out of: (A) A premarital or postmarital agreement; (B) a separation or
divorce settlement; (C) a spouse's election; (D) a similar arrangement arising out
of a prospective, existing, or previous marital relationship between the parties; (E)
a contract to make or not to revoke a will or trust; (F) a contract to exercise or
not to exercise a power of appointment; (G) a transfer in satisfaction of a duty of
support; or (H) a reciprocal transfer,
(2) A fiduciary's power relating to the administration or management of assets, including the power of a fiduciary to sell, lease or mortgage property, and
the power of a fiduciary to determine principal and income;
(3) A power to appoint a fiduciary;
(4) A discretionary power of a trustee to distribute principal before termination of a trust to a beneficiary having an indefeasibly vested interest in the income
and principal;
(5) A nonvested property interest held by a charity, government, or governmental agency or subdivision, if the nonvested property interest is preceded by an
interest held by another charity, government, or governmental agency or subdivision;
(6) A nonvested property interest in or a power of appointment with respect
to a trust or other property arrangement forming part of a pension, profit-sharing,
stock bonus, health, disability, death benefit, income deferral, or other current or
deferred benefit plan for one or more employees, independent contractors, or their
beneficiaries or spouses, to which contributions are made for the purpose of distributing to or for the benefit of the participants or their beneficiaries or spouses
the property, income, or principal in the trust or other property arrangement, except a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is created by an

98.
99.
100.
The
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transactions, is nondonative transfers.0 1 According to the drafters of
the USRAP:
[T]he Rule Against Perpetuities is a wholly inappropriate instrument of
social policy to use as a control over such arrangements. The period of the
rule-a life in being plus 21 years-is not suitable for nondonative transfers, and this point applies with equal force to the 90-year allowable waiting period under the wait-and-see element of Section 1 ....102

Thus, by excluding nondonative transfers from the statutory rule,
the USRAP is contrary to numerous decisions holding the Commonlaw Rule to be applicable to commercial transactions such as options, °3 preemptive rights in the nature of a right of first refusal, 1°4
leases to commence in the future at a time certain or on the happening
of a future event such as the completion of a building,'0 5 and top
leases and top deeds with respect to interests and minerals.' 6
When section 4 of the USRAP (which excludes nondonative transfers from the statutory rule)'0 7 is read in conjunction with section 9
(which repeals the Common-law Rule),'08 it becomes evident that
nondonative transfers are not subject to any rule against perpetuities.
The comments to the USRAP support this conclusion by explaining
that "[s]ince the Common-law Rule is superseded by this Act... a
election of a participant or a beneficiary or spouse; or
(7) A property interest, power of appointment, or arrangement that was not
subject to the common-law rule against perpetuities or is excluded by another
provision of this code.
101. The comments to the USRAP explain that:
A transfer can be supported by consideration and still be donative in character and
hence not excluded from the Statutory Rule. A transaction that is essentially gratuitous in nature, accompanied by donative intent on the part of at least one party
to the transaction, is not to be regarded as nondonative simply because it is for
consideration.
USRAP, supra note 8, § 4 cmt. A.
102. USRAP, supra note 8, § 4 cmt. A.
103. Milner v. Bivens, 335 S.E.2d 288 (Ga. 1985).
104. Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1969); Robroy Land Co.,

Inc. v. Prather, 601 P.2d 992 (Wash. 1979).
105. Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County, 115 S.E.2d 207 (Ga. 1960).
106. Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982).
107. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-4 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 4.
108. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-8 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 9.
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nonvested property interest, power of appointment, or other arrangement excluded from the Statutory Rule by this section is not subject to
any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise."' °9
2.

Nondonative Transfers and Title Searches in West Virginia

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals previously has held
that the Rule Against Perpetuities is applicable to a renewable option
for the purchase of land, ° an option to repurchase the minerals obtained in a deed,"' and the provisions of a deed giving the grantees
the right to purchase the surface of the land.' However, under the
USRAP, each of these transactions could be considered nondonative
and hence may not be subject to any rule against perpetuities. Accordingly, lawyers performing title searches in the state should not assume
that any nondonative transactions that may affect a deed are void as a
violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
C. Potential Problems Created by the Uniform Act
Despite the USRAP's widespread adoption," 3 legal scholars have
advanced several criticisms of the Act. 14 These criticisms focus on
both wait-and-see in general and the 90-year period.

109. USRAP, supra note 8, § 4 cmt.; see also Juliano & Sons v. Chevron, 593 A.2d
814, (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991):
We hold that the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities as adopted in New
Jersey abolishes the common law and embodies the State's entire law on the rule.
We further conclude that, while the statute is not retroactive and applies only to
property interests 'created on or after the effective date of th[e] act,' Section 5,
the nondonative commercial transaction for consideration executed before .the Act's
effective date in this case is no longer subject to the common-law rule against
perpetuities.
ML at 815.
110. Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 56 S.E. 524 (W. Va. 1907).
111. Woodall v. Bruen, 85 S.E. 170 (W. Va. 1915).
112. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).
113. See supra text accompanying note 12.
114. See Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48; see also Ira M. Bloom,
Perpetuities Refinement: There is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 (1987).
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Extension of Dead-Hand Control of Property

Opponents of the USRAP argue that the Uniform Act will extend
dead-hand control of property because they maintain that 90 years is
longer than the period generally produced by an actual saving
clause.11 5 This criticism is based on the belief that the drafters of the
USRAP incorrectly assumed that the average age of the youngest person who is a life in being under a saving clause is approximately six
years old." 6 Professor Jesse Dukeminier explains:
Mathematically, such an average is highly improbable. To reach an average
of six years requires an enormous percentage of trusts with infant beneficiaries to balance all the Rule-violating trusts for fertile octogenarians,
the youngest beneficiary may well be
unborn widows, and others where
7

20, 30, 40, or 50 years old.'

Accordingly, Dukeminier and other opponents of the USRAP believe
that a well drafted saving-clause8 will often produce a period of time
substantially less than 90 years.1
Professor Lawrence Waggoner, the Reporter for the Uniform Act,
has responded to this criticism by explaining that although the drafters'
method of determining the 90-year waiting period "may not be scientifically accurate to the nth degree, the Drafting Committee considered it reliable enough to support a waiting period of 90 years, given
the margin-of-safety function that it performs.""

9

As Waggoner fur-

ther points out, the fact that the USRAP's wait-and-see period is 90
years does not mean that all trusts or property arrangements falling
under the wait-and-see period will last for the full 90 years. 2 0 In
fact, most trusts and other property arrangements will terminate much
earlier.'

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1032-33.
Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1033.
Id. at 1033-35.
Waggoner, Rationale, supra note 56, at 167-68.
Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 11, at 579.
Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule supra note 11, at 580 ("As with a perpetuity
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Preservation of Poorly Drafted Instruments

Another potential problem created by the USRAP involves wills or
trusts drafted by unskilled laypersons or careless lawyers. Opponents of
the USRAP argue that instruments containing violations of the Common-law Rule, and therefore subject to the USRAP 90-year wait-andsee element, often also contain poorly drafted dispositive provisions.122 Thus, families burdened by the inept work of a thoughtless
drafter may be unable to obtain relief for 90 years because judicial
reformation under the USRAP2 3is generally not available until the end
of the 90-year waiting period.
However, the USRAP does grant the right to reformation before
the expiration of the 90-year wait-and-see period in at least two situations: first, when a class gift is not yet but might later be invalidated
under the Uniform Act and the time has arrived when the share of one
or more class members is to take effect in possession or enjoyment,
and second, when a nonvested property interest can vest, but cannot do
so before the expiration of the 90-year waiting period. 24
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USRAP
There are several alternatives to the USRAP. The two most popular alternatives to the Uniform Act are immediate cy pres, which was
followed in West Virginia prior to the adoption of the USRAP'5 and
wait-and-see based on measuring lives.

saving clause, most trusts or other property arrangements will terminate by their own terms
far earlier, leaving the perpetuity period established by the Uniform Act to extend unused
into the future long after the interests have vested and the trust or other arrangement has
been distributed.").
122. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1036-38.
123. See discussion supra part IlI.C.
124. W. VA. CODE § 36-1A-3 (Supp. 1992); USRAP, supra note 8, § 3.
125. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals labeled this method of reform "equitable modification" instead of immediate cy pres, although the underlying principle is the
same. See discussion supra part I.B.
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Immediate Cy Pres

26
an interest that vioUnder the doctrine of immediate cy pres,1
lates the Rule Against Perpetuities is subject to immediate reform by a
court in a manner that carries out the transferor's intent as closely as
possible within the perpetuities period. 27 Courts exercising immediate
cy pres generally have followed a conservative school of thought when
reforming instruments that violate the Common-law Rule. Thus, courts
using cy pres "construe perpetuities violations out of the instrument,
reform offending language, reduce any excessive age contingencies to
21, and in general eliminate uncertainties that cause perpetuities prob-

lems."

128

Immediate cy pres has been favored by several distinguished legal
scholars, 129 and one has even asserted that "[i]f academics were
forced, by some powerful monarch, to agree on one perpetuities reform, in all probability it would by cy pres."'130 Nevertheless, immediate cy pres is not without its problems.
There are two primary arguments against immediate cy pres. First,
reformation by a court requires a lawsuit, and second, cy pres unreasonably broadens a court's power to rewrite wills without any guidelines except the testator's presumed intent. The USRAP obtains the
benefits of cy pres while reducing its potential problems by employing
deferred-reformation at the end of the 90-year waiting period. Since
most interests will in fact vest within 90 years, the USRAP diminishes
the possibility that a court will have to reform an instrument which
violates the Common-law Rule, yet allows reformation if the interest
does not in fact vest within 90 years.

126. Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1898
(1986) ('The term cy pres, coming from Law French, means as near as practicable.").
127. Immediate Cy Pres is alternatively referred to as equitable reformation, equitable
approximation, or equitable modification.
128. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1071.
129. Lewis M. Simes, Perpetuities in California Since 1951, 18 HASTINGS LJ. 247,
253 (1967).
130. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1072.
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Immediate Cy Pres previously was adopted in at least seven states
either by judicial decision13 1 or statutory enactment.'
However, of
the seven states, California and West Virginia have now adopted the
134
USRAP,133 and Hawaii is in the process of adopting the Act.
B.

Wait-and-See for the Measuring Lives

The wait-and-see reform movement initially proceeded on the
assumption that the permissible vesting period should be determined by
reference to the measuring lives in being at the creation of the interest.1 35 Accordingly, at least fourteen states previously had
statutes 136 or judicial decisions 137 providing for a wait-and-see period based on lives in being at the creation of the interest. Even the Restatement (Second) of Property 38 has adopted an artificial list of
39
lives to measure the wait-and-see period.
Despite its initial attraction, wait-and-see based on measuring lives
has several disadvantages. First, it is difficult to draft unambiguous and
131. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1071 n.125 (citing In re
Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Haw. 1970); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank,
262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980)).
132. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1071 n.125 (citing CAL.
CIV. CODE § 715.5 (West 1982); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
442.555 (Vernon 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-78 (West. Supp. 1987); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (West 1984)).
133. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200 to 21231 (Deering 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-lA-1
to 36-1A-6 (Supp. 1992).
134. 1992 Ilaw. Sess. Laws 262 (approved by the Governor June 18, 1992).
135. Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 11, at 573.
136. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1073 nn.136-37 (citing
ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(2)(a) (West Supp. 1986);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.103 (1985); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 47-1-17.1 (Michie Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (Baldwin
Supp. 1985); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38
(1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-5-6 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 501 (1975);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (Michie 1986)); see infra note 139.
137. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 48, at 1074 n.140 (citing Phelps
v. Shropshire, 183 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1966); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 97 A.2d 207
(N.H. 1953)).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3(2) (1983).
139. Iowa adopted a wait-and-see statute using the Restatement's measuring lives but
added some extra lives to the list. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68(2) (West Supp. 1986).
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uncomplicated statutory language that identifies the measuring lives
because statutory language must be drafted to cover numerous unanticipated situations.1" Furthermore, the measuring-lives approach can impose costly administiative burdens because this approach requires the
identification of actual individuals as the measuring lives and their
lives must then be traced to identify the last survivor and the date of
their death.
The USRAP's 90-year wait-and-see period eliminates these prob'
Three of
lems because it is "easy to determine and unmistakable."141
the fourteen states that previously provided for 42wait-and-see based on
measuring lives have now adopted the USRAP.
VI.

CONCLUSION

West Virginia's adoption of the USRAP eliminates many of the
unjust consequences caused by the Common-law Rule's approach of
invalidating interests based on what might happen. Under the USRAP,
the test of invalidity is shifted to what actually happens, and interests
that violate the Common-law Rule are given 90 years in which they
must actually vest or terminate. At the expiration of this 90-year period, any interests that have neither vested nor terminated are judicially
reformed.
The USRAP should provide a nearly litigation-free setting concerning perpetuities matters and should be simple to administer. Best of
all, West Virginia lawyers need not learn a new and complex perpetuity law under the USRAP. Lawyers practicing in the state should continue drafting instruments that comply with the Common-law Rule and
should continue to use standard perpetuity saving clauses.
John D. Moore

140. See USRAP, supra note 8, at 345 (explaining that "[a]s a result of the difficulty
of drafting such a orie-size-fits-all clause, any list of measuring lives is likely to contain
ambiguities.").
141. Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 11, at 577.
142. FLA. STAT. ch. 689.225 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103 to 111.1039
(Michie 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-1001 (Michie 1992).
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